This paper analyzes regulatory design for agroecosystem management on public rangelands. We present an informational and institutional environment where three of the most prominent regulatory instruments on public rangelands -input regulation, cost-sharing/taxation, and performance regulation -can be defined and compared. The paper examines how the optimal regulation is shaped by the informational and institutional constraints faced by federal land management agencies (FLMAs) such as the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service. These constraints include informational asymmetries between ranchers and FLMAs, limitations on FLMAs' ability to monitor ranch-level ecological conditions, and constraints on FLMAs' actions due to budget limitations and restrictions on the level of penalties they can assess. The theoretical model extends the previous work of Baker (1992), Prendergast (2002) , and Hueth and Melkonyan (2009) by considering optimal regulation by a budget-constrained regulator in an environment of asymmetric information and moral hazard. 
Introduction
Rangeland is the dominant land type in the United States, comprising 34.2% of total land area (731 million acres), compared to 32.4% forested, 17% agricultural, and 2% urban (Loomis, 1993) . Over 235 million acres of this rangeland is under the management of the federal government and is used for livestock grazing via contractual arrangements between ranchers and federal land management agencies (FLMAs). Two FLMAs -the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) -manage the livestock grazing leases on over 98% of these 235 million acres (GAO, 2005) . Given the amount of rangeland managed by FLMAs through federal grazing leases, the regulation of ranching on public rangelands plays a central role in rangeland management and overall natural resource management in the United States.
Ranching is, in many respects, a prototypical agroecosystem management problem. As in all agroecosystem management problems, ranching is an activity that generates both private economic gains for agricultural producers as well as externalities. The externalities are caused by the in ‡uence of livestock grazing on rangeland vegetation. Grazing stresses native perennial grasses, reducing their ability to compete with native shrubs, non-native annual grasses, and noxious weeds. The consequences of change in rangeland vegetation away from native perennials include reduction in the quality of wildlife habitat for game animals and sensitive species, increased frequency and severity of wild…res, and increased soil erosion. 1 While ranchers have private incentives to maintain ecosystem health -healthy rangeland provides more productive and sustainable forage base for livestock -the externalities 1 There exists an extensive literature on the external costs associated with ranching. Keith and Lyon (1985) , Cory and Martin (1985) , Roach, Loomis, and Motroni (1996) , and Shonkwiler and Englin (2005) …nd that livestock grazing and recreation have competing values on public rangelands. Other externalities have also received attention in the literature. These include the in ‡uence of rangeland degradation on soil erosion (Knapp, 1996) , carbon sequestration (Follett, Kimble, and Lal , 2001 ; Verburg et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2006; Havstad et al., 2007) , and wild…re activity (Billings, 1990 ) and its e¤ects on ranch pro…ts (Maher, 2007) and wild…re suppression costs (Rollins and Kobayashi, 2010). One of the most robust …ndings of this literature is that these external costs increase dramatically with changes in rangeland vegetation away from native perennial grasses. associated with ranching cause their private objectives to di¤er from social goals. Re ‡ect-ing the importance of external costs on public lands, the "multiple use" and "sustainable yield" mandates of the BLM, USFS, and other FLMAs require these government agencies to consider the externalities associated with ranching when setting regulation. In particular, these two mandates require that FLMAs take into account wildlife, watershed health, and recreation as well as commercial interests such as ranching (multiple use), and that they work to ensure that the resource values on public lands are available at current levels in perpetuity (sustainable yield). 2 This paper analyzes regulatory design for agroecosystem management on public rangeland. We develop a model with two parties: an agent (rancher) that uses the agroecosystem for private economic gain and a principal (FLMA or regulator) that manages the agroecosystem for both economic gains of the rancher and public goods related to ecosystem health.
We consider an informational environment where the rancher is better informed than the FLMA about the e¤ectiveness of her/his actions in achieving both her/his private economic objectives and in in ‡uencing the public good aspects of ecosystem health, and where there is moral hazard in the implementation of any regulatory scheme because some of the rancher's actions cannot be observed by the FLMA. In addition, we assume that the FLMA is constrained in its ability to monitor ranch-level ecological conditions. This aspect of the model re ‡ects the fact that high monitoring costs make it infeasible for FLMAs to engage in regular and detailed monitoring of ranch-level ecological conditions on public rangelands (Watts, Shimshack, and LaFrance, 2006). As high monitoring costs make regular and detailed monitoring impossible, FLMAs are forced to base regulation on imperfect signals of how the ranchers'activities in ‡uence ecosystem health.
In addition to these informational constraints, we model institutional constraints faced by FLMAs. It is assumed that the FLMA is constrained by its exogenous budget to fund policy but can supplement this exogenous budget through taxation. This feature of the 2 The USFS adopted the principles of multiple use and sustainable yield with the "Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960." The BLM followed suit in 1964 with the "Classi…cation and Multiple Use Act of 1964". model re ‡ects current practice on public rangelands, where FLMAs have …xed budgets in the short-run but are able to use revenues collected through grazing fees to fund their activities. 3 We also consider ranchers' participation constraints, which require that a rancher's pro…t from ranching on public rangeland exceed her/his outside option. As a result, the FLMA is constrained in the penalties (either monetary or non-monetary) it can assess when it is socially e¢ cient for the rancher to remain in operation.
The modeled informational and institutional environment allows us to de…ne the most prominent regulatory instruments on public rangelands and to compare their relative e¢ -ciency. These instruments are input mandates, where the regulator mandates the level of usage of certain inputs, cost-sharing/taxation, where the regulator subsidizes or taxes the use of certain inputs, and performance regulation, where the regulator compensates or penalizes the rancher based on the value of an observed performance measure.
We begin by analyzing the e¢ ciency of the three regulatory instruments in light of the informational and institutional constraints faced by FLMAs. We demonstrate that each regulatory instrument can be part of an e¢ cient regulatory regime and characterize the conditions under which each of the three instruments dominates the others. When FLMAs are unconstrained in the level of bonus or penalty they can assess and when there is perfect monitoring, the …rst-best outcome can be achieved through performance regulation. In a more realistic setting, however, the FLMA is constrained in the level of bonus/penalty it can assess and/or monitoring is imperfect. Under these circumstances, both input mandates and cost-sharing/taxation can dominate performance regulation. After considering each regulatory instrument in isolation, we consider how the e¢ ciency of the regulatory regime is improved when performance regulation is used in combination with an input mandate or costsharing/taxation. We identify conditions when an input mandate and cost-sharing/taxation can improve the e¢ ciency of performance regulation.
To our knowledge, this paper is the …rst to compare the e¢ ciency properties of these three regulatory instruments -input mandates, cost-sharing/taxation, and performance regulation -in a setting that captures the salient informational and institutional constraints faced by FLMAs on public rangelands. By analyzing these three regulatory instruments in the same model, we provide a platform to compare the optimal mix of regulatory instruments with existing FLMA regulations for ranching on public rangelands. This allows us to consider how FLMAs' informational and institutional constraints have shaped existing regulation and evaluate possible explanations for the continued reliance of FLMAs on input mandates, in the form of grazing restrictions, despite their demonstrated ine¢ ciency in reaching a target level of environmental performance (e.g., Zhao, 2008) . The informational and institutional constraints on e¢ cient management of public rangelands are shared by other public agencies tasked with agroecosystem management. As such, the obtained results concerning the relative e¢ ciency of the three regulatory instruments have implications that extend beyond the regulation of ranching on public rangelands.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the salient features of the regulation of ranching on public rangelands in the United States. In Section 3, we discuss the relevant literature on regulatory design and its relationship to our paper. Section 4 develops the basic model. Section 5 characterizes the optimal regulation for each of the three regulatory instruments, while Section 6 examines their relative e¢ ciency.
In Section 7 we consider optimal performance regulation when used in combination with an input mandate (Section 7.1) or cost-sharing/taxation (Section 7.2). Finally, Section 8 summarizes the main results and discusses their implications for optimal regulation of ranching on public rangelands.
Regulation on Public Rangelands
FLMAs use several regulatory instruments to reduce the negative externalities associated with ranching and to ensure that public rangelands are managed in accordance with their multiple use and sustainable yield mandates. The most prominent regulatory instrument used by FLMAs are restrictions on the number of livestock ranchers can graze on their public land allotments. 4 Livestock grazing restrictions are aimed at ensuring the long-term ecological health of public rangeland allotments by limiting the rancher's ability to in ‡ict ecological harm through over-grazing. In addition, as we explain below, FLMAs can use the possibility of expanded or reduced grazing privileges to motivate the rancher to manage their rangeland in accordance with FLMAs'ecological health objectives.
In principle, grazing restrictions specify the maximum number of livestock a rancher can run on her/his public land allotment. In practice, however, ranchers are also required to make "substantial use"of range forage or risk possible loss of grazing privileges. It has been argued that these provisions, termed "non-use"provisions, often lead ranchers to use public rangeland more intensively than they would otherwise (Hess and Holechek, 1995) . 5 Reduced grazing privileges lower a rancher's potential pro…ts from ranching and can diminish the sale value of their grazing permit and base ranch. The combination of the maximum grazing restrictions and non-use provisions amounts to a de facto mandate that forces most ranchers to choose the number of livestock they graze on their public rangeland allotment from a narrow interval.
In addition to facing grazing restrictions, ranchers must pay a per animal, per month grazing fee. An e¢ cient grazing fee would be set equal to the marginal social value of forage (marginal social value of grazing an additional animal) that incorporates the marginal forage value for ranchers and the marginal external environmental costs. Grazing fees on public 4 These are often referred to as Animal Unit Month (AUM) restrictions, where an AUM is the amount of forage needed to sustain one cow and her calf, or one horse, or …ve sheep or goats for one month. 5 Johnson and Watts (1989) …nd relatively low levels of non-use on federal rangelands, ranging from 15% to 22% between 1963 and 1984. rangelands, however, are set nationally, and are thus ine¢ cient for most ranches because of the heterogeneity of range conditions. Johnson and Watts (1989) …nd that despite this ine¢ ciency and the existence of non-use provisions, stocking rates on public land allotment are responsive (though not strongly) to changes in grazing fees. 6 It has also been suggested that under certain degraded rangeland conditions, it may be socially e¢ cient to subsidize grazing above privately optimal levels as a means of noxious weed control and wild…re fuels reduction (Papanastasis, 2009 ).
Besides grazing restrictions and grazing fees, ranchers operating on public rangeland are often obligated to engage in construction and/or maintenance of "range improvements" as part of the conditions of their lease (USDI BLM, 2008). "Range improvements" can have many purposes, including enhancing livestock grazing management, improving watershed conditions, and enhancing wildlife habitat. "Range improvements" can be structural, such as water pipes, wells, and fences, or non-structural, such as re-seeding and prescribed burns.
While an FLMA and a rancher will often work jointly to achieve desired "range improvements" -FLMAs have budgets for "range improvements" that are funded through grazing fees -these activities add to the rancher's cost of operating on public rangelands (Torell and Doll, 1991; Xu, Mittelhammer, and Torell, 1994) . A rancher can also propose range improvements, either through a Cooperative Range Improvement Agreement, which speci…es a division of cost between the FLMA and the rancher, or a Range Improvement Permit, where the range improvement is completely funded by the rancher.
FLMAs pursue a strategy of both long-and short-term monitoring of the ecological conditions on public rangeland allotments. Monitoring is performed in order to assess the ranchers'compliance with their contractual obligations on their allotments (e.g., range improvements) and with the "Standards of Rangeland Health,"which are a series of ecological health goals set forth by the FLMA (USDI BLM, 2007). 7 Long-term monitoring is focused 6 Watts, Shimshack, and LaFrance (2006) and others have argued that because non-use provisions encourage ranchers to graze their maximum allowed number of livestock, grazing fees represent a …xed cost rather than a variable cost for most ranchers. 7 The Standards for Rangeland Health that apply to a given allotment are set by local 15-member Resource on changes in the status and health of vegetation on an allotment and is generally performed at the time of permit renewal. 8;9 In contrast, short-term monitoring includes monitoring the time and intensity of grazing, the total number of animals on the allotment, and utilization, which is a measure of the amount of forage left on the land after the grazing season and the amount of time that forage is allowed to rejuvenate after grazing (Swanson, 2006; Swanson, 2008 : Personal Interview).
If monitoring reveals that current management is degrading rangeland health, or that the rancher is failing to comply with her/his contractual obligations, this could lead to reductions in the rancher's grazing privileges or the imposition of mandatory range improvements.
Both of these consequences of monitoring serve as penalties on ranchers for violations of contractual obligations and reduce their expected returns from operating on public rangeland.
Conversely, monitoring can result in the expansion of grazing privileges if current grazing is found to do limited ecological harm. In this way, monitoring and the associated penalties/bonuses provide the rancher with incentives to manage their allotments in accordance with the FLMAs'ecological health objectives.
Advisory Councils. Nevada, for example, has three Resource Advisory Councils: the Mojave-Southern Great Basin, the Sierra Front-Northwestern Great Basin, and the Northeastern Great Basin (USDI BLM, 2010). Each Resource Advisory Council has ‡exibility to adapt the Standards of Rangeland Health to local conditions and priorities. In addition, the ecological indicators used to assess a permittee's compliance with the Standards for Rangeland Health are set based on the speci…c ecological, climatic, and topographical characteristics of the region (Swanson, 2008: Personal Interview) . Locally speci…ed indicators are necessary because, for example, the appropriate level of ground cover on an allotment may vary signi…cantly across publicly-managed rangelands throughout the United States depending on precipitation, soil depth, elevation, and other factors. 8 A long-term goal of FLMAs for public rangelands is to enhance the productivity of range vegetation, particularly of perennial herbaceous plants or perennial bunch grasses. Perennial bunch grasses provide a number of ecological services, including the provision of good wildlife habitat and good quality forage, and are considered to be the best signal of overall rangeland health given the resource values that FLMAs are interested in promoting (Swanson, 2008: Personal Interview) . 9 Long-term monitoring is generally performed at the time of permit renewal unless there is a serious resource concern on the allotment, such as soil erosion or degraded riparian areas, or the rancher is involved in an ongoing range improvement project that involves a comprehensive monitoring program.
Related Literature
Of the three regulatory instruments that we consider in this paper, cost-sharing/taxation in the form of grazing fees has received the most attention in the previous literature. This focus on grazing fees can be explained in part by the considerable controversy that federal grazing fees have generated (Hess and Holecheck, 1995) . Some authors argue that federal grazing fees are set too low relative to the market value of forage (Fowler, Torell and Gallacher, 1994;  LaFrance and Watts, 1995) , while others maintain that federal grazing fees are set appropriately given the cost of compliance with federal regulations on public rangelands (Torell and Doll, 1991; Xu, Mittelhammer, and Torell, 1994) . Several studies construct theoretical models to characterize the optimal grazing fee in the presence of externalities (McCarl and Brokken, 1985; Hu¤aker, Wilen, and Gardner, 1989) and informational asymmetries between the FLMA and the rancher (Watts, Shimshack, and LaFrance, 2006). Relative to this literature, we consider the optimal grazing fee taking into account both the externalities associated with ranching and a richer set of informational and institutional constraints faced by FLMAs. In addition, we consider how the optimal grazing fee is in ‡uenced by other regulatory instruments in concurrent use on public rangelands.
Regulatory mechanisms other than grazing fees have received substantially less attention in the literature. In an analysis of input regulation (input mandates), Torell, Lyon, and Godfrey (1991) develop an optimal control model to examine a rancher's stocking-rate decisions. The authors consider the relative economic importance of current-period animal performance and future forage production for a yearling stocker operation in eastern Colorado. They …nd that current period animal performance de…ned by weight gain drives economic stocking-rate decisions. In an analysis of incentive-based mechanisms, Hu¤aker, Wilen and Gardner (1989) propose the use of a grazing fee in conjunction with "transfer payments" based on observed range conditions as a potential mechanism to induce ranch compliance with the FLMA's ecological health objectives. Our work builds on these studies by considering both input mandates (stocking-rates) and performance regulation (incentive-based mechanisms) in a setting that captures the informational and institutional constraints on public rangelands and allows for the e¢ ciency of these regulatory instruments, along with cost-sharing/taxation, to be de…ned and compared.
There is a large and burgeoning economics literature on regulatory design. A number of studies in this literature examine the relative merits of quantity instruments (input mandates), price instruments (cost-sharing/taxation), and performance regulation. Weitzman (1974) demonstrates how a quantity instrument can dominate price instruments when there is uncertainty and asymmetric information in policy design. The simultaneous use of di¤er-ent regulatory instruments has also been analyzed. Shavell (1984) studies an environment where multiple instruments emerge as an optimal regulatory response to accident risk. In a related analysis, Innes (1998) shows how ex ante safety standards (similar to the input mandates in our analysis) can be welfare-reducing when optimal liability rules (performance Our framework is similar to their model which incorporates moral hazard and private information on the producer's part about farm-level ecological conditions. In contrast to these studies, we do not consider adverse selection (ranchers operating on public land allotments cannot opt out of regulation), nor does income support for producers enter the principal's objective (unlike in many other agricultural contexts, income support for ranchers is not an explicit goal of FLMA policy). We also do not consider monitoring of farmer (rancher) compliance with environmental regulation. 11 Indeed, out model departs from the literature by examining how the combination of the institutional and informational constraints faced by FLMAs (described above) in ‡uences the relative e¢ ciency of three pervasive and relatively unsophisticated regulatory instruments (subsidy/taxation, input regulation, and performance regulation).
Finally, on a purely formal level, our analysis is related to the work of Baker (1992),
Prendergast (2002), and Hueth and Melkonyan (2009). Baker (1992) considers incentive
contracts based on a performance measure that is di¤erent from the principal's objectives.
Similarly to Baker (1992), we …nd that the e¢ ciency of regulation depends on the relationship between the principal's objective and the performance measure on which regulation is based.
Prendergast (2002) demonstrates that output-based incentives are preferable to input-based incentives when there is uncertainty regarding the appropriate technology for a given task.
Hueth and Melkonyan (2009) identify alternative relative bene…ts of output-based and inputbased incentives. Our model extends these three studies by examining multiple regulatory instruments under an alternative informational environment and by considering additional institutional constraints.
Model
We consider a strategic interaction between two parties, a regulator (she) and a rancher (he).
The rancher utilizes a production process with two inputs, denoted by e 1 and e 2 : In addition to in ‡uencing the rancher's private payo¤, these inputs a¤ect the health of the ecosystem where the rancher carries out his production activities and, by doing so, cause externalities.
In the absence of regulation, the rancher's private payo¤ function is given by
where F (e 1 ; e 2 ) has the quadratic form
where 1 ; 2 > 0; 1 > w 1 > 0; and 2 > w 2 > 0: We assume that e 1 is purchased from a market and w 1 represents the market price of e 1 : In contrast, e 2 represents the rancher's e¤ort directed toward enhancing production and/or the ecosystem health and w 2 represents the marginal cost of e¤ort e 2 :
In the absence of regulation, the rancher will choose e 1 and e 2 to maximize his private payo¤:
Since the rancher's private payo¤ function is strictly concave, the …rst-order conditions of this optimization problem, as well as of the other optimization problems in this paper, are both necessary and su¢ cient. The rancher's optimal choice of inputs in the absence of regulation is given by
Under our assumption that 1 w 1 > 0 and 2 w 2 > 0 the rancher will choose strictly positive levels of e 1 and e 2 in the absence of regulation.
The social value of the public good related to ecosystem health is given by
where " i (i = 1; 2) is a random variable with support
Thus, the social value of the public good is a random variable whose distribution is a¤ected by the rancher's choice of inputs. It is assumed that the rancher learns the realizations of random variables " 1 and " 2 before making his choice of inputs e 1 and e 2 . In contrast, the regulator does not observe the realizations of " 1 and " 2 : Given our speci…cation, an increase in input e i (i = 1; 2) leads to an increase in the variance of V .
The expected social welfare, U , is de…ned as the expectation of the sum of the rancher's private payo¤, F (e 1 ; e 2 ) w 1 e 1 w 2 e 2 , and the value of the public good related to ecosystem health, V (e 1 ; e 2 ; " 1 ; " 2 ). Since any payment related to a regulatory instrument is a transfer between the regulator and the rancher, it does not in ‡uence the social welfare.
Using e
and e
N R 2
from (1), we obtain the expected social welfare in the unregulated case:
The expected social welfare without regulation will be used as a benchmark against which the e¢ ciency of each regulatory mechanism will be compared.
Another important benchmark for accessing the e¢ cacy of di¤erent regulatory mechanisms is the social optimum. The social optimum is given by the solution to the following maximization problem:
[F (e 1 ; e 2 ) w 1 e 1 w 2 e 2 + V (e 1 ; e 2 ; " 1 ; " 2 )] :
The socially optimal input choices are
; otherwise
We assume that i + i1 + i2 " i > w i (i = 1; 2) for all " i 2 [ " i ; " i ], so that the socially optimal choices of e 1 and e 2 are always strictly positive. Note that the …rst-best level of input e i is a non-constant function of random variable " i : More intuitively, the …rst-best requires that the rancher optimally use his private information. For example, when parameter i2 is strictly positive the …rst-best calls for the rancher to increase the use of input e i in response to increases in " i :
The expected social welfare evaluated at the social optimum is given by
It follows immediately from (2) and (4) that when the expected marginal product of either e 1 or e 2 on ecosystem health is non-zero -i.e., i1 = E (V e i ) 6 = 0, i = 1; 2 -the rancher's private optimal choices of e 1 and e 2 in the absence of regulation are socially ine¢ cient. The extent of the ine¢ ciency is positively a¤ected by the expected marginal social values of the rancher's e¤orts jE (V e 1 )j and jE (V e 2 )j. Expression (4) also reveals that the ine¢ ciency of the rancher's private optimum in the absence of regulation is independent of whether input e i is detrimental (E (V e i ) < 0) or bene…cial (E (V e i ) > 0) to ecosystem health. In addition, the degree of the ine¢ ciency of the rancher's privately optimal choices, e N R 1 and e N R 2 , is increasing in the variance of the expected marginal social values of the rancher's e¤orts, V ar (V e i ), i = 1; 2, which measure the value of the rancher's private information regarding the e¤ect of input e i on rangeland ecological health. It follows from (4) that the higher the value of the rancher's private information V ar (V e i ) the larger the di¤erence between the expected social welfare under the …rst-best and unregulated outcomes.
Regulatory Instruments
Recognizing that the rancher's privately optimal choices of e 1 and e 2 do not fully take into account the e¤ect of his activities on the public good associated with ecosystem health, the regulator contemplates introducing a regulatory mechanism. The regulator has three regulatory instruments at her disposal to improve upon the unregulated outcome; (1) input mandate, where the regulator …xes the rancher's use of the observable input, (2) costsharing/taxation, where the regulator subsidizes/taxes the rancher's use of the observable input, and (3) performance regulation, where the regulator pays/taxes the rancher based on the value of an observable performance measure related to the rancher's use of inputs e 1 and e 2 .
The regulator, however, does not have full ‡exibility when choosing a regulatory mechanism. First, the regulator faces informational constraints. It is assumed that the rancher's private payo¤, F (e 1 ; e 2 ) w 1 e 1 w 2 e 2 , and use of input e 2 are not observable by the regulator and, as a result, cannot be a part of a regulatory mechanism. In addition, the regulator observes only a subset of relevant ecosystem health outcomes over which the rancher has in ‡uence. This subset of ecosystem health outcomes -henceforth termed the performance measure -provides an imperfect signal of the impact of the rancher's choices of e 1 and e 2 on ecosystem health. Hence, a regulatory instrument can only be conditioned on the realizations of e 1 and the performance measure, and not on the rancher's use of e 2 or on the realizations of the rancher's private payo¤, F (e 1 ; e 2 ) w 1 e 1 w 2 e 2 , or the public good related to ecosystem health, V (e 1 ; e 2 ; " 1 ; " 2 ). It is further assumed that the regulator has full knowledge of how the observable input, e 1 , in ‡uences the rancher's private payo¤.
Second, the regulator's choice of a regulatory mechanism is constrained by her available budget B 0; the regulator cannot implement a regulatory mechanism for which the expected budget outlay exceeds B. In contrast, the ex post payment to the rancher may exceed B. The assumption that the budget cannot be exceeded ex ante is reasonable in circumstances where the regulator is proposing a regulatory mechanism to a large number of ranchers, so that instances where the regulator's ex post payment to a rancher exceeds B are balanced by instances where it is smaller than B.
The timing in our model is as follows. First, the regulator announces the regulatory mechanism, and the rancher learns the level of each regulatory instrument. Subsequently, the rancher learns the realization of uncertainty concerning the impact of his choices of e 1 and e 2 on the performance measure and selects e 1 and e 2 . Then, the realization of the performance measure is observed by both parties and the regulator also learns the rancher's choice of e 1 : Finally, the payments (if any) are made between the regulator and the rancher.
Input Mandate
Input regulation in the form of grazing restrictions is the most prominent form of regulation on public rangelands. As we discussed in Section 2, non-use provisions in federal grazing leases imply that grazing restrictions are de facto mandates for most ranchers operating on public rangeland. For this reason, we consider the scenario where the regulator mandates the rancher's choice of the observable input, denoted by e 1 . Under this regulatory instrument, the rancher has to pay a relatively high penalty if his use of e 1 di¤ers from e 1 and, as a result, the rancher never …nds it advantageous to violate the mandate. It is costless for the regulator to enforce the input mandate, so that the regulator's budget constraint is not relevant when only this regulatory instrument is used. 12 Note also that the regulator cannot condition e 1 on the realization of " 1 since the regulator does not observe this information. Due to this rigidity and the fact that the …rst-best calls for input e 1 to vary with the rancher's private information " 1 ; the input mandate will be unable to restore the …rst-best.
Since e 1 and e 2 are neither complements nor substitutes in the rancher's private payo¤ function, mandating e 1 does not in ‡uence the rancher's choice of e 2 . As such, provided the rancher uses the public rangeland he will set e 2 equal to the unregulated level e
given by 12 Monitoring, of course, is not costless. Indeed, the Government Accountability O¢ ce (GAO) estimates that monitoring costs on public rangelands exceed all of the grazing fees collected (cited in Watts, Shimshack, and LaFrance, 2006). Our assumption of zero monitoring costs, however, is equivalent to assuming that the regulator's budget for monitoring is not related to her budget to fund regulation. This assumption approximates the current policy at the BLM and USFS where grazing fees can be used to fund "range improvements" and other regulation but not monitoring (Watts, Shimshack, and LaFrance, 2006 
0:
First, consider the case where the regulator's optimization problem (5) is unconstrained.
The optimal input mandate in this case is given by
which is simply the expectation of the socially optimal level of input e 1 from (3). If the rancher's payo¤ evaluated at the unconstrained optimum e
is non-negative, The expected social welfare under the optimal input mandate is given by
Because the regulator knows how e 1 in ‡uences both F and E (V ) (though ex post she cannot directly observe either F or V ), she can set e 1 at the expected social optimum
. Hence, when the expected marginal product of the observable input e 1 on ecosystem health is non-zero, E (V e 1 ) 6 = 0; the input mandate will increase welfare relative to the unregulated outcome. The input mandate, however, can not restore the …rst-best outcome unless the expected marginal product of the unobservable input e 2 on the ecosystem health is zero, E (V e 2 ) = 21 = 0, and the rancher does not possess private information regarding the e¤ect of his inputs on the health of ecosystem, V ar (V e 1 ) = V ar (V e 2 ) = 0.
Cost-Sharing/Taxation
We now turn to examining the scenario where the regulator either subsidizes (cost-sharing)
or taxes the rancher's use of the observable input e 1 . In both cases, the cost of input e 1 incurred by the rancher is (1 s)w 1 e 1 , while the cost borne by the regulator is sw 1 e 1 . Thus, s > 0 corresponds to cost-sharing while s < 0 represents taxation. As we discussed in Section 2, taxation of forage use through grazing fees is an important element of FLMA policy on public rangelands. In addition to taxation, we consider cost-sharing because it has been suggested that in certain degraded rangeland conditions, it may be socially e¢ cient to subsidize grazing above privately optimal levels as a means of noxious weed control and wild…re fuels reduction.
The rancher's choice of e 1 under cost-sharing/taxation is given by
:
Note that similarly to the input mandate the rancher does not use his private information regarding the e¤ect of the inputs on the health of ecosystem when he chooses e 1 and e 2 .
Also, as in the previous subsection, the rancher's choice of e 2 under cost-sharing is equal to the unregulated level given by (1).
Given the rancher's choice of e C 1 as a function of s, the regulator's optimization problem can be written as:
E F e 
and the rancher's participation constraint
where is a lump-sum transfer between the rancher and the regulator. Combining the constraints (7) and (8), we can re-write this optimization problem as Letŝ C denote the solution to the unconstrained problem (9) . We have that
Let s C (B) denote the solution to the binding budget constraint. It is given by
By concavity of the objective function in (9) and the structure of its constraint, the regulator's constraint in (9) is binding at the optimum if and only ifŝ C > s C (B). This inequality applies only if the e¤ects of e 1 on the rancher's private economic objective and on the public good aspects of ecosystem health are congruent (E (V e 1 ) = 11 > 0) so that cost-sharing is optimal. Using the expressions forŝ C and s C (B) ; we obtain thatŝ 
Hence, the optimal cost-sharing parameter s and the resulting choice of input e 1 by the rancher are given, respectively, bŷ 
A couple of observations regarding these results are in order. First, when taxation is optimal ( 11 0) or when cost-sharing is optimal ( 11 > 0) and the regulator has a relatively large budget so that the budget constraint is slack at the optimum (B B C ), the elicited choices of the inputs and the resulting expected social welfare under the optimal cost-sharing/taxation mechanism coincide with those under the optimal input mandate.
This equivalence between the two regulatory instruments is an artefact of the model's in-formation and production structures. The regulator knows how e 1 in ‡uences F and, hence, how changes in the marginal cost of e 1 in ‡uence the rancher's choice of e 1 . As a result, the regulator can choose s to achieve the expected socially optimal usage E [e 1 (" 1 )]. This implies that, as was the case with the optimally chosen input mandate, cost-sharing/taxation improves e¢ ciency relative to the unregulated outcome when E (V e 1 ) 6 = 0: However, it cannot restore the …rst-best unless E (V e 2 ) = 0 and V ar (V e 1 ) = V ar (V e 2 ) = 0.
Second, when cost-sharing is optimal and the budget constraint is binding, the expected social welfare under the optimal cost-sharing mechanism is lower than the expected social welfare under the optimal input mandate. The extent of the decrease in the expected social welfare caused by the budget constraint is determined by the di¤erence between the expected socially optimal usage of the observable input, E [e 1 (" 1 )], and the level dictated by the regulator's budget constraint, e C 1 (B). This ine¢ ciency is decreasing in the regulator's budget
] is independent of B) and increasing in the expected marginal social value of the rancher's e¤ort
is increasing in 11 while e C 1 (B) is independent of 11 ). Finally, we conclude from these two …ndings that an optimally chosen input mandate weakly dominates an optimally chosen cost-sharing arrangement.
Performance Regulation
Suppose that both the rancher and the regulator observe an imperfect signal of how the rancher's use of e 1 and e 2 in ‡uences ecological health:
P (e 1 ; e 2 ; 1 ; 2 ) = ( 11 + 12 1 ) e 1 + ( 21 + 22 2 ) e 2 ;
where i (i = 1; 2) is a random variable with support
It is further assumed that Corr (" i ; i ) > 0 for i = 1; 2: Note that the e¤ect of input e i on the variance of the performance measure P is similar to that for the social value of the public good; the variance of P is increasing in e 1 and e 2 . It is assumed that performance measure, P , is veri…able so that it can be a part of a regulatory mechanism. We consider a linear incentive contract of the form + P; where is a lump-sum transfer between the regulator and the …rm (the base payment) and 0 is the piece rate per unit of the performance measure P (the power of the incentive contract). We call this regulatory instrument performance regulation.
Before turning to the formal analysis note that performance regulation has a key advantage over the other two instruments. It provides the rancher with incentives to respond to private information about 1 and 2 : When random variables 1 and 2 are correlated with random variables " 1 and " 2 , respectively, performance regulation gives the rancher the incentive and ‡exibility to adjust his choice of inputs based on his private knowledge of ranch-level ecological conditions and the a¤ect of the inputs on ecosystem health. As we formally show below, the bene…t of giving the rancher this ‡exibility is increasing in the accuracy of the performance measure (as measured by its distortion (Corr (" i ; i ) ; i = 1; 2) and noisiness (V ar (P e i ) ; i = 1; 2)) and in the value of the rancher's private information V ar (V e 1 ) and
The rancher's optimization problem under performance regulation is given by max e 1 ;e 2
[F (e 1 ; e 2 ) w 1 e 1 w 2 e 2 + + P (e 1 ; e 2 ; 1 ; 2 )] :
The rancher's optimal choice of inputs is given by
; otherwise for i = 1; 2:
Given the rancher's choices e subject to the regulator's budget constraint
Combining the constraints (12) and (13), we can re-write this optimization problem as:
subject to E F e 
The algorithm for identifying the optimal solution to the optimization problem (14) is similar to that in the previous subsection. Let^ P denote the solution to the unconstrained problem (14) . It is given bŷ
The solution to the binding constraint in (14) is denoted by P (B) and is given by
Using the expressions for^ P and P (B) ; we obtain that^ P P (B) if and only if
: (17) By concavity of the objective function in (14) and the form of the constraint in (14), the optimal performance bonus and the resulting choice of input e i (i = 1; 2) are given, respectively, by^
The expected social welfare under performance regulation is given by
A number of results follow immediately from the expression for^ P . 13 First, the power of the incentive scheme is determined by the expected marginal social values of the rancher's e¤ort jE (V e i )j (i = 1; 2). This is the case irrespective of whether input e i is detrimental (E (V e i ) < 0) or bene…cial (E (V e i ) > 0) to ecosystem health. Second, note that 13 The expression for the optimal performance regulation when the budget constraint is slack,^ P , is analogous to the expression for the optimal power of an incentive contract in Baker (1992).
Corr (P e i ; V e i ) = Corr (" i ; i ) captures the level of distortion in the performance measure.
It follows from the expression for^ P that the less distorted the performance measure (the larger Corr (" i ; i )) the more valuable it is in providing incentives to the rancher. As a result, the power of the incentive mechanism is increasing in both Corr (" 1 ; 1 ) and Corr (" 2 ; 2 ).
Third, observe that V ar (P e i ) captures the noisiness of the performance measure. An increase in the noisiness of the performance measure decreases its value to the regulator for providing incentives to the rancher. As a result, the regulator will o¤er a lower-powered incentive scheme under a relatively noisy performance measure. Finally, the power of the incentive scheme is increasing in the variances of the expected marginal social values of the rancher's e¤orts, V ar (V e 1 ) and V ar (V e 2 ) ; which measure the value of the rancher's private information regarding the e¤ect of his inputs on ecosystem health.
When the constraint in (14) is binding, the optimal piece rate per unit of the performance measure, P (B), is determined by the regulator's ability to fund regulation, which is a function of her exogenous budget, B, and the rents from ranching without regula- Consider now the expected social welfare. First, note that performance regulation always increases welfare relative to the unregulated outcome. When the budget constraint is not binding, the extent to which performance regulation improves welfare is determined by the same factors that determine the power of the incentive scheme; the expected social welfare is increasing in the expected marginal social values of the rancher's inputs jE (V e i )j, decreasing in the level of distortion of the performance measure (relatively small values of Corr (" i ; i )), decreasing in the noisiness of the performance measure, V ar (P e i ), and increasing in the variance of the expected marginal social values of the rancher's inputs, V ar (V e i ).
Importantly, the quality of the performance measure is a critical determinant of the bene…ts of performance regulation. When the performance measure provides a good signal of how the rancher's actions in ‡uence ecosystem health (low distortion and noisiness), performance regulation can substantially increase the expected social welfare.
The expected social welfare under a binding budget constraint is lower than under a slack budget constraint. From (18) , the loss in the expected social welfare resulting from a binding budget constraint is given by
Expression (19) reveals that the loss in the expected social welfare is a function of the di¤er-ence between the second-best optimal piece rate,^ P , and the level dictated by the regulator's budget constraint, P (B). This ine¢ ciency is decreasing in the regulator's budget, B, and the rents from ranching without regulation, F e N R
1 ; e N R 2
w 2 e N R 2 , which increase P (B) but do not a¤ect^ P . Moreover, this ine¢ ciency is increasing in the expected marginal social values of the rancher's e¤orts, jE " (V e i )j = j i1 j (i = 1; 2), which increase^ P but do not a¤ect P (B).
Finally, when the performance measure is a perfect signal of the rancher's input choices (V (e 1 ; e 2 ; " 1 ; " 2 ) = P (e 1 ; e 2 ; 1 ; 2 ) for each e 1 and e 2 ) and the regulator's budget constraint does not bind (B B P ), performance regulation can achieve the social optimum given by (4). 14 To see this, note that (15) implies that^ P = 1 under perfect monitoring. Substitutinĝ P = 1 and V (e 1 ; e 2 ; " 1 ; " 2 ) = P (e 1 ; e 2 ; 1 ; 2 ) for each e 1 and e 2 into (18) yields (4). On the other hand, when the regulator's budget constraint binds (B < B P ), the …rst-best outcome cannot be achieved even with perfect monitoring.
14 Perfect monitoring implies that
2) for all e 1 and e 2 . 
Pairwise Comparisons of Regulatory Instruments
By construction of the model -the rancher has no private information about how e 1 and e 2 in ‡uence his private objective -the input mandate and cost-sharing/taxation are equivalent when the regulator's budget constraint does not bind. However, when the regulator's budget constraint binds under the optimal cost-sharing arrangement, the input mandate strictly dominates the cost-sharing arrangement.
Since the optimal input mandate weakly dominates cost-sharing/taxation, we focus on how the relative e¢ ciency of the input mandate versus performance regulation, measured by U I U P ; is a¤ected by the parameters of the model. When the regulator's budget constraint does not bind (B B P ), the optimal input mandate dominates the optimal performance regulation if and only if
It follows from this inequality that the e¢ ciency of the performance regulation relative to the input mandate is determined by the same factors that determine the power of the incentive scheme. In particular, the performance regulation is more likely to dominate the input mandate when (i) the performance measure is less distorted (larger Corr (P e i ; V e i ) = Corr (" i ; i ), i = 1; 2), (ii) the performance measure is less noisy (smaller V ar (P e i ), i = 1; 2), and (iii) the rancher's information regarding the e¤ect of his inputs on ecosystem health is more valuable (large V ar (V e i ), i = 1; 2).
When the regulator's budget constraint binds (B < B P ), the input mandate dominates the performance regulation if and only if
Thus, when B < B P , the e¢ ciency of the performance regulation relative to the input mandate is determined by the factors that a¤ect both^ P and P (B), which are the the optimal piece rates under a non-binding and binding budget constraints, respectively. It follows from (20) that the optimal performance regulation is more likely to dominate the optimal input mandate when the regulator has a greater ability to fund regulation, which, as we explain in Section 5.3, is determined by her exogenous budget, B, and the rents from ranching without regulation, F e N R
2 . Note also that if the input mandate dominates the performance regulation when the regulator's budget constraint does not bind then it will dominate the performance regulation for all B.
Using (6) and (18) we obtain that
where^ P and P (B) are given by (15) and (16), respectively. Since^ P ; P (B) 1; it follows from (21) that the e¢ ciency of the input mandate relative to the performance regulation is increasing in the expected marginal product of the observable input, e 1 , on ecosystem health jE (V e 1 )j = j 11 j. Figure 1 illustrates how the relative e¢ ciency of the three regulatory instruments is determined by the regulator's exogenous budget, B, for the case when the expected marginal product of the observable input, e 1 , on ecosystem health is positive, i.e., E (V e 1 ) = 11 > 0.
We focus on the case where E (V e 1 ) > 0 in Figure 1 because it is only when E (V e 1 ) > 0 that the regulator's budget constraint is relevant for cost-sharing/taxation. 15 Figure 1 depicts two parameterizations of the model. In Case 1, the expected social welfare under performance regulation is higher than under the input mandate (and, hence, cost-sharing) when the regulator's budget is su¢ ciently large (B max B C ; B P ). In Case 2, the expected social welfare under the input mandate is higher than under performance regulation for all B.
Finally, consider the e¢ ciency of the optimal performance regulation relative to the optimal cost-sharing/taxation. When cost-sharing is preferred to taxation (E (V e 1 ) > 0), we demonstrate in the Appendix that cost-sharing dominates performance regulation for some B if and only if the dominance holds for all B. Thus, while the regulator's budget constraint determines her choice between the input mandate and performance regulation, it does not in ‡uence her choice between cost-sharing and performance regulation.
When taxation is preferred to cost-sharing (E (V e 1 ) < 0), it follows from (11) and (18) that if taxation dominates performance regulation when the regulator's budget constraint does not bind, then it will dominate performance regulation for all B. It is also the case that if performance regulation dominates taxation when B = 0, then this dominance holds for all B. If neither of these two cases hold, then the regulator's budget constraint determines her choice between taxation and performance regulation. In particular, there exists a critical level of B (< B P ) below which U C > U P and above which U C < U P . Thus, taxation is preferred to performance regulation under a relatively tight budget.
7 Joint Use of Regulatory Instruments
Performance-Regulation and Input Mandate
We now turn to the joint use of the input mandate and performance regulation. Under this scenario, the regulator mandates the rancher's choice of the observable input, denoted by e P I
1 , and institutes a payment to/from the rancher based on the ex post realization of the veri…able performance measure, P: As in Section 5.3, this ex post payment is made according to the linear incentive contract P I + P I P , where P I is a lump-sum transfer between the regulator and the rancher and
0 is the piece rate per unit of P . It is also assumed that the rancher has to pay a relatively high penalty if his use of e 1 di¤ers from e P I
1 and, as a result, the rancher never …nds it advantageous to violate the mandate. 
Combining the constraints (22) and (23), we can re-write this optimization problem as: max e P I 1 ;
P I
E F e P I
1 ; e Due to space considerations we only report the results for the non-binding budget constraint case. The results regarding the role of the regulator's informational constraints for the relative e¢ ciency of the joint use of the input mandate and performance regulation for the binding budget constraint case are similar to the non-binding case. However, the derivation and presentation of these results are considerably more involved.
The solution to the unconstrained problem (24) is denoted byê 
:
The expected social welfare under joint use of the input mandate and performance regulation is given by
It follows directly from (6) and (25) that using an input mandate and performance regulation in tandem is unambiguously preferred to the use of the input mandate in isolation.
Similarly, it follows from (18) and (25) 
: where^ P is de…ned by (15) . This inequality demonstrates that the input mandate is more likely to improve the e¢ ciency of performance regulation when the expected marginal product of the observable input, e 1 , on ecosystem health, j 11 j = jE (V e 1 )j, is large, and when the performance measure provides a poor signal of in ‡uence of e 1 on ecosystem health, i.e., high distortion (low Corr (" 1 ; 1 )) and noisiness (high V ar (P e i )) (see Section 5.3). Under these conditions, the input mandate improves welfare by limiting the rancher's ability to make socially ine¢ cient choices of e 1 , while performance regulation continues to motivate the rancher to pursue more socially e¢ cient choices of e 2 .
The results presented in this section provide a rationale for the reliance of FLMAs on input mandates (grazing restrictions) in conjunction with penalties/bonuses based on observed performance. Our model predicts that this regulatory mix will improve welfare relative to performance regulation alone when monitoring provides a poor signal for how livestock graz-ing in ‡uences ecological health. Indeed, several studies have documented the di¢ cultly in monitoring the relationship between livestock grazing and rangeland health. For example, Holechek (1988) describes the challenges to setting appropriate grazing restrictions for a public land allotment due to heterogeneity in vegetation, soil type, slope, and distance to water, all of which lead to non-uniform forage utilization by livestock across an allotment.
Performance Regulation and Cost-Sharing
In this section we examine the joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance regulation.
Under this scenario, the regulator subsidizes (cost-sharing) or taxes the rancher's use of the observable input, e 1 , and mandates a payment based on the ex post realization of the veri…able performance measure, P . Similarly to Section 5.2, the cost of input e 1 incurred by the rancher is (1 s P C )w 1 e 1 , while the cost borne by the regulator is s P C w 1 e 1 . Thus, s P C > 0 corresponds to cost-sharing and s P C < 0 corresponds to taxation. As in Sections 5.3 and 7.1, the ex post payment is made according to the linear incentive contract
where is a lump-sum transfer between the regulator and the …rm and F (e 1 ; e 2 ) (1 s P C )w 1 e 1 w 2 e 2 + + P ( e 1 ; e 2 ; 1 ; 2 )
:
Given the rancher's choice of e P C 1 s P C ; P C ; 1 and e P C 2 P C ; 2 , the regulator's optimization problem can be written as:
+V e P C 1 s P C ; P C ; 1 ; e P C 2 P C ; 2 ; " 1 ; " 2 3 7 5
subject to the regulator's budget constraint,
and the rancher's participation constraint,
Combining the constraints (26) and (27) , we can re-write this optimization problem as:
In what follows, we focus on the scenario where the regulator's optimal choices of s As in the previous section and for the same considerations, we restrict our focus in the remainder of this section to the case where the regulator's budget constraint does not bind.
The solution to the unconstrained problem (28), denoted byŝ P C and^ P C ; is given bŷ 
The expected social welfare under the joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance regulation is given by
If follows from (29) that the joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance regulation unambiguously improves welfare over both cost-sharing/taxation and performance regulation in isolation. That cost-sharing/taxation in combination with performance regulation dominates cost-sharing/taxation alone follows directly from (11) and (29) . Similarly, using (18) and (29), it can be shown that cost-sharing/taxation in combination performance regulation dominates performance regulation alone if and only if 1 2 ^ P ^ P , which always holds because^ P 1. 16 These results hold because cost-sharing/taxation improves welfare by bringing the use of the observable input, e 1 , in line with its marginal social costs/marginal social bene…ts while still allowing the rancher the ‡exibility to use his private knowledge of ranch-level ecological conditions when making his input choices.
From (25) and (29), the joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance regulation is more likely to dominate the joint use of an input mandate and performance regulation when the performance measure provides a good signal of the in ‡uence of the observable input, e 1 , on ecosystem health (i.e., low distortion (high Corr (" 1 ; 1 ) ) and noisiness (low V ar (P e i ))).
The joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance regulation has the advantage that it
gives the rancher an incentive to use his private knowledge of ranch-level ecological conditions when choosing e 1 . This advantage, however, only improves welfare relative to the joint use of an input mandate and performance regulation when the performance measure provides a good signal of e 1 's in ‡uence on ecosystem health. When the performance measure provides a poor signal, the joint use of an input mandate and performance regulation dominates by …xing the rancher's choice of e 1 at the ex ante social optimum, E [e 1 (" 1 )].
Discussion
We have developed a theoretical model of optimal regulation by a budget-constrained regulator under asymmetric information, moral hazard, and imperfect monitoring. We used the model to evaluate the relative e¢ ciency of three prominent regulatory instruments on public rangelands: input mandates, cost-sharing/taxation, and performance regulation. The model extends the received literature by presenting an informational and institutional environment that closely resembles the actual regulation of ranching on public rangeland and that allows for the e¢ ciency of these three regulatory instruments to be evaluated and compared.
Our analysis yields a number of robust conclusions about the relative e¢ ciency of the three regulatory instruments. First, we identify two scenarios under which an optimal input mandate is superior to cost sharing/taxation and performance regulation. The …rst scenario is when the regulator faces a relatively strict budget constraint so that she is limited in her ability to elicit optimal input use through cost-sharing and performance regulation. The second scenario is when the signal of the rancher's use of inputs (the performance measure) is relatively uninformative. When the performance measure is relatively uninformative, combining an input mandate with performance regulation can improve e¢ ciency. As we explain in Section 7.1, this result provides a rationale for the reliance of budget-constrained FLMAs on input mandates (i.e., grazing restrictions) in conjunction with penalties/bonuses based on observed performance on public rangelands.
Second, similarly to an input mandate, cost-sharing/taxation improves welfare by bringing the use of observable inputs in line with their marginal social costs/social bene…ts. However, when there is congruence between the e¤ect of an observable input on the rancher's private economic objective and on ecosystem health, the e¢ ciency of cost-sharing may be undermined by the regulator's budget constraint. We …nd that when the regulator is not budget-constrained, a mixture of performance regulation and cost-sharing/taxation is the optimal regulatory regime.
Third, we …nd that performance regulation improves social welfare when the performance measure is a su¢ ciently accurate signal of how the rancher's activities in ‡uence ecosystem health. As one would expect, the optimal performance regulation under perfect monitoring achieves the …rst-best outcome. One of the main advantages of performance regulation is that, in contrast to an input mandate and cost-sharing/taxation, it gives the rancher the incentives and ‡exibility to use his private knowledge of ranch-level ecological conditions when making his input choices. Given the potential for considerable heterogeneity of range conditions even within small geographic areas, this is an important bene…t. Performance regulation, however, has two disadvantages. First, the capacity of performance regulation to achieve desired outcomes is limited under tight budget constraints, which restrict the regulator's ability to encourage e¢ cient input use through either performance bonuses or penalties. Second, due to the di¢ culties of monitoring changes in rangeland health on each ranch, FLMAs often have to base regulation on a very distorted or noisy signal of how the rancher's activities have in ‡uenced ecosystem health. Under these circumstances, performance regulation can be dominated by an optimal input mandate or cost-sharing/taxation.
We prove that U C > U P for some B if and only if U C > U P for all B:
To prove (30), we show that U C > U P for all B if and only if 2 11
We demonstrate this result in three steps.
First, it follows directly from the expressions for U C and U P ( (11) and (18), respectively) that U C > U P for all B max B C ; B And from (18), when B < min B C ; B P ,
= U N R + F e Using (32) and (33), we obtain that U C > U P for all B < min B C ; B Combining the results proved in the above three steps, we obtain that U C > U P for all B if and only if (31) holds. The inequality (31) is independent of B: Hence, U C > U P for some B if and only if U C > U P for all B.
